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health events arises in many clinical scenarios, from clinical decision support to tele-health systems to home-
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We believe that all of these scenarios are similar, and share a common framework of design. In attempting to
solve a particular instance of the problem, that of device alarm fatigue due to numerous false alarms, we
devised a modular system based around this framework. This modular design allows us to easily customize the
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ABSTRACT
We describe the Generic Smart Alarm, an architectural framework
for the development of decision support modules for a variety of
clinical applications. The need to quickly process patient vital signs
and detect patient health events arises in many clinical scenarios,
from clinical decision support to tele-health systems to home-care
applications. The events detected during monitoring can be used as
caregiver alarms, as triggers for further downstream processing or
logging, or as discrete inputs to decision support systems or physi-
ological closed-loop applications.
We believe that all of these scenarios are similar, and share a
common framework of design. In attempting to solve a particular
instance of the problem, that of device alarm fatigue due to numer-
ous false alarms, we devised a modular system based around this
framework. This modular design allows us to easily customize the
framework to address the specific needs of the various applications,
and at the same time enables us to perform checking of consistency
of the system.
In this paper we discuss potential specific clinical applications of
a generic smart alarm framework, present the proposed architecture
of such a framework, and motivate the benefits of a generic frame-
work for the development of new smart alarm or clinical decision
support systems.
1 Introduction
Within the modern hospital room it is common practice to contin-
ually monitor patient vital signs with a variety of medical devices
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attached to the patient. These medical devices can alert medical
professionals to changes in the patient state. Many medical devices
can be configured with threshold alarms: alarms that activate when
a certain vital sign crosses a predefined threshold. These alarms can
be vital for the timely detection of reversible emergency states [6,
13]. Unfortunately, current devices with threshold based alarms are
limited in the following ways:
1. The alarm is only raised when the predefined threshold is
crossed.
2. Each vital sign monitor is independent of other devices and
oblivious to information from those devices.
3. The monitors typically do not leverage patient context infor-
mation or general medical knowledge.
These shortcomings result in many false positive alarms [22]
(which fatigue caretakers [14]) as well as fail to provide the medical
professionals with more useful and interesting information about
the current state of the patient [5, 18]. A reduction in the number
of false alarms has been shown to improve patient safety [14]. It
is easy to imagine that more capable alarm and clinical decision
support systems (CDSS) could be built by combining physiologic
data streams from different medical devices as well as other sources
(such as the patient’s EHR.) Indeed, over the last several years,
companies such as CareFX [8], Cerner [4], GE [9] and Phillips [24]
have built information technology products that attempt to provide
a more cohesive view of a patient’s state. Typically these sys-
tems collect patient vitals from different discrete devices and either
record them in an electronic health record or push them to a cen-
tralized monitor (such as a large computer monitor in the patient’s
room or a command center staffed by medical professionals). A
‘smart’ alarm or CDSS takes this concept further; the real-time
medical information streaming from the different devices would
be combined with information from the patient’s health record in
order to automatically suppress irrelevant alarms, predict trends in
the patient’s status, and possibly even intelligently coordinate the
actions of medical devices (closed loop control). While the poten-
tial benefits of these types of systems seem promising, there are
a number of challenges the research community will face. Sittig
et-al [23] has identified 10 of these ‘Grand challenges’ of CDSS.
We have chosen to focus on two of the aformentioned 10 chal-
lenges: 1) How do we disseminate best practices in CDSS design,
development, and implementation? and 2) How do we create an ar-
chitecture for sharing executable CDSS modules and services? In
previous work [2] authors Arney, Sokolsky, and Lee worked with
the FDA to define a framework (now known as the Generic Infu-
sion Pump) to aid researchers and industry in understanding how to
build a safe infusion pump and is now used as an example by the
FDA Infusion Pump Initiative [7]. We propose that a Generic Smart
Alarm (GSA), similar in spirit to the GIP, could provide a valuable
framework for researchers to understand the issues concerning the
design, implementation, and testing of smart alarms and Clinical
Decision Support Systems. In this paper we:
1. describe the various applications of ‘smart alarm’ and medi-
cal decision support systems we have investigated;
2. summarize the various approaches we have explored to real-
ize these systems and the challenges faced in doing so; and
3. describe the Generic Smart Alarm architecture that we be-
lieve will facilitate the experimentation and research neces-
sary to ultimately apply smart alarms and CDSS effectively
in the clinical setting
2 Specific Applications
2.1 False Alarm Suppression for CABG Patients
Post-operatice patients after artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery
are at particular risk of physiologic instability [20]. Continuous
monitoring of a combination of common vital signs in the intensive
care unit allows for detection of physiologic changes so practition-
ers may intervene in a timely manner and prevent complications.
In many cases, however, individual thresh-hold alarms can produce
a large number of false positives. For example, the fingerclip sen-
sor of a pulse-oximeter can fall off the patient or react to the artifi-
cial lighting of the care environment to produce erroneous readings.
These sorts of basic failures can be mitigated by a system which is
able to monitor multiple vital signs and distinguish data artifacts
(such as disconnected leads which lead to sharp vital sign drops)
from true patient distress.
To this end, we have implemented a rule-based system which
combines four major vital signs commonly monitored in the ICU:
heart rate (HR), blood pressure (BP), blood oxygen saturation (SpO2),
and respiratory rate (RR). To do so, we interviewed ICU nurses to
determine ranges for classifying each vital sign as a member of
some collection of fuzzy sets (classifying, for example, a blood
pressure between 50 and 60 as a mix of ‘Low’ and ‘Normal’, be-
tween 60 and 100 as ‘Normal’, and between 100 and 107 as being
a mix of ‘Normal’ and ‘High’. See Figure 1). Afterward, nurses de-
termined rules that identified combinations of these vital sign sta-
tuses which would be cause for concern. An example fragment of
the rule table is shown in Table 1. The ‘smart’ alarm worked by
monitoring a patient’s four vitals, classifying those into fuzzy sets,
and searching the rule table for the corresponding alarm level to
output. Combining vital signs in this way produced a very large re-
duction (57.13 percent over 1,451 hours of recorded CABG patient
data) in the number of false alarms generated without suppressing
any true alarms. Classification of vital signs using fuzzy sets helped
to overcome the difficulty of establishing a ruleset customized to
each patient’s baseline vital signs. Fuzzy set classifiers can easily
be modified to address a specific patient with, for example, a very
low ‘Normal’ resting heart rate, without rewriting the entire rule
set.
2.2 Decision Support for Neurocritical Care
For many treatable ominous conditions in the neurocritical care unit
(seizure, stroke, etc), time to diagnosis is critical. The patient’s
Figure 1: Sample fuzzy set classification for Heart Rate
BP HR SPO2 RR Alarm Level
Normal Normal Normal Normal 0
High Normal Normal Low 1
High Low Normal Normal 2
Very Low Normal Normal High 3
High High Low High 2
Table 1: Small subset of the rule set.
outcome depends on the ability and experience of the caregiver to
recognize patterns in nonspecific changes of multiple sensors, as
well as recognize long-term trends in patient status by summarizing
changes over multiple days of data. The utility of simple threshold-
based alarms to guide this sort of pattern recognition is limited [21].
There are more illustrative interpretations of physiologic data that
require computational aid for human comprehension. The incor-
poration of these tools into clinical care has not been conclusively
demonstrated.
Additionally, despite the lack of definitive evidence for many of
newer monitor-guided therapies (brain oxygen, microdialysis, etc),
the actionable nature of their associated threshold-based alarms are
enticing to neurointensivists and traumatologists. They lead to ad-
ditional tests and empiric treatment of the many potential causes of
changes in monitor values - in a temporizing manner - until (if and
when) a definitive etiology is discovered. Each additional test and
therapy is associated with some cost and/or potential risk of harm
to the patient.
To this end, we recognized the possibility of utilizing multiple,
low cost/low risk patient monitors to reduce the abundance of un-
necessary alarms, thereby reducing reactionary temporizing treat-
ments. Additionally, there exists the opportunity for integration of
statistical methods and machine learning techniques to detect long
term trends in available patient data. These trends are often difficult
for medical experts to detect due to the quantity of data available
from disparate sources and the short amount of time available to
process it before it becomes irrelevant. Integrating and process-
ing multiple data streams would enable the discovery of significant
features of the data that would improve prognostic and diagnostic
ability.
2.3 Closed Loop Control of PCA Pumps
A Patient Controlled Analgesia (PCA) pump is a device designed
to provide a prescribed bolus dose of pain medication to a patient
when the patient presses a button. PCA pumps are associated with
a large number of adverse events [12, 15]. The most common type
of adverse event is oversedation [19]. An excessive dose of the
analgesic can cause neurologic depression which may lead to res-
piratory depression and eventually respiratory distress. In extreme
cases the patient may not be able to breathe adequately, leading to
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Figure 2: Multi-vital PCA pump control to prevent overdose
death. Overdoses may have many causes including pump configu-
ration errors [10], the use of the wrong concentration of drug, drug
interactions, and PCA-by-proxy (a caretaker or family member re-
quests a dose on the patient’s behalf). We have previously inves-
tigated systems that integrate one or more patient vital signs (such
as RR, HR, and SpO2) in order to determine if a patient is in respi-
ratory distress and, if so, to disable the PCA pump for the duration
of the distress state [16, 1]. The general topology of the system
consists of patient monitors streaming data to a central controller.
The central controller uses the data to determine if the patient is
in respiratory distress, and if so, remotely disables the PCA pump,
closing the loop between sensors and devices.
3 Challenges
3.1 Choice of Decision Model
‘Intelligent’ medical systems such as those described in Section 2
will have difficulty seeing widespread use in the field unless the
research community can reach a scientific understanding of how
various decision support approaches behave in a given domain, as
it has been shown that no single technique is likely to be appropriate
in all domains [3]. Ultimately this scientific understanding should
be a product of analyses and experiments performed by the research
community at large. We envision that providing a common generic
framework to researchers will facilitate collaborative investigation
and aid in overcoming these problems.
3.2 Interoperability
A major challenge of such medical systems is the requirement that
they must interface with a broad range of devices developed by dif-
ferent manufacturers. The GSA architecture must have the ability
to capture patient data streaming from vital sign monitors and other
medical devices in the hospital room. Additionally, certain appli-
cation domains require the GSA to output to a device (e.g., a PCA
pump or output display), and receive feedback from that device.
Thus, the GSA architecture must be able to incorporate modules
which enable interdevice communication.
3.3 Flexible Application of Existing Inference Approaches
Another major difficulty is that many promising approaches to ma-
chine inference do not apply directly to the numerical data streams
commonly encountered in medicine (e.g., discrete event bayesian
networks, decision trees, or even the table based system described
in Section 2.2 require coarse, high level events, while patient data
is often encountered in the form of numerical data and waveforms).
Therefore some sort of data pre-processing, such as fuzzy set clas-
sification, must occur to use real-time vitals in an “intelligent” med-
ical system. More interestingly, these preprocessing steps may be
different for separate patient populations (e.g., a high heart rate in
a febrile patient is a normal physiologic response without need for
intervention. A high heart rate in a post-operative CABG patient
may signify hypovolemia or an arrhythmia, both of which would
require immediate interventions) or even between patients (e.g., an
athlete’s resting heart rate is different than that of the average pop-
ulation). Realistic “intelligent” medical systems should take these
differences into account and provide a way for practitioners to eas-
ily configure the system for a given patient or patient population.
Since the core of the inference system itself would likely be re-
source intensive to curate (e.g., generated using large datasets or
extensive surveys of domain experts), the patient centric configu-
ration parameters should be independent of the core intelligence if
possible.
4 Architecture
We propose that the best way of solving the challenging problems
discussed in Section 3 is through the development of a general
architecture which is flexible enough that it enables us to rapidly
prototype systems which are reconfigurable, and thus can address
the problems in different ways, and subject these systems to veri-
fication and validation to determine the most effective (and patient
safe) solution.
The example applications from Section 2 share architectural com-
monalities: raw data from medical devices is processed in succes-
sive stages; the final stage of processing is some form of machine
inference algorithm; this algorithm produces a high level result
(e.g., an alarm is raised, prognostications with respect to patient
state is provided, or a command is transmitted to a medical device
to alter its operating mode). In order to address the challenges de-
scribed in Section 3 and due to the conceptually compartmentalized
nature of the tasks in each application domain, we propose that a
Generic Smart Alarm take the form of a fully configurable and flex-
ible processing pipeline, where different preprocessing tasks can be
linked with appropriate inference tasks, and these inference tasks
with various outputs.
4.1 Pre-Processing Components
A smart alarm implementation using the GSA would consist of a
collection of components which sequentially process and analyze
input data. These plug-ins can be categorized according to their
behavior and computational demands:
1. Lightweight components perform simple transformations on
their input. Examples: the fuzzy set classifiers described in
Section 2.1 or a task that applies a FFT to a waveform.
2. Stateful components maintain state from previous process-
ing actions. Examples would include a task that maintains
the running average of an input stream or a task that main-
tains trending information for a patient vital.
3. High-Level components typically take abstract inputs (i.e.,
not raw data) and compute some result. Examples would in-
clude inference mechanisms, such as a Bayesian Belief Net-
work (BBN) or a rule table as described in Section 2.1.
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Figure 3: GSA configured as a smart alarm for CABG patients
4.2 Modular Inference Components
An inference components designed to work with the GSA should
also be modular and customizable for different care contexts just
as the low level processing tasks are customizable for specific pa-
tients. We believe that this feature would be most helpful for re-
searchers who are trying to determine what inference algorithm or
expert system is most effective in a certain context. As an exam-
ple, the rule table inference used in the CABG smart alarm should
be configurable with arbitrary rule tables. Likewise, if a BBN was
used, the inference task hosting the BBN should have the ability
to utilize an arbitrary BBN. Researchers could then directly com-
pare different inference approaches within an otherwise identical
system.
4.3 Pipeline Configuration
The GSA framework, combined with a palette of appropriate com-
ponents, and a configuration which specifies how data flows from
one components to another would be sufficient to instantiate a spe-
cific smart alarm for a given application. The following section pro-
vides example GSA configurations for the applications described in
section 2.
5 Example Configurations
5.1 Smart Alarm Rule Table
The rule table smart alarm (Figure 3) consists of a fuzzy set classi-
fier for each vital sign and a rule table expert system. Raw data is
classified by fuzzy set classifiers, which can be parameterized for
each patient, allowing medical professionals to tune the alarm for a
specific patient. The classifications are forwarded to the rule table
and appropriate alarm level is determined.
5.2 Decision Support for Neurointensive Care
Decision support systems, which we are interested in applying in
a neurointensive care context, may need to be significantly more
complex than the smart alarm system based solely on rule tables
in order to capture the complexity of the domain in which it is to
advise. We envision a system by which the architecture is adapted
to include two major intelligent components: The first monitors the
input vital sign data for long-term trends identified by medical ex-
perts as helpful in practice but difficult to identify manually due
to the large amount of computation required to do so. These are
output to a display program where they can serve as alerts or noti-
fications to medical professionals. The second component receives
input from the original vital sign monitors, the trends currently de-
tected by the trend detection mechanism, and any pertinent patient
data from linked medical databases, and outputs a series of possible
medical conditions, alerts, or suggestions to a display. Response by
medical professionals can be received by the display, which should
also function as an input device. The medical professional could,
for example, select one of the diagnoses to view the evidence that
lead the module to suggest it, confirm the diagnosis to refine the
device’s decision making process, or enter more information not
available to the machine, such as visual patient inspections per-
formed by nurses, to improve the accuracy of the system.
5.3 Sensor Fusion and Smart Control for PCA Pumps
Post-CABG patient care commonly involves PCA. In this setting a
smart controller for a PCA pump could be configured by taking the
pipeline for the rule table smart alarm and extending it with an extra
processing step that takes as input alarm level and then determines
whether to send a signal to disable the PCA pump.
6 Verification and Validation
A high level distinction can be made between the two different
types of correctness questions a designer of a smart alarm or CDS
system should answer if the system in question will ever be used in
a clinical context. The first question asks ‘Does the overall sys-
tem behave as specified?’ The second question asks ‘Does the
high-level inference model effectively accomplish what we believe
it does?’ We believe the GSA could help researchers and system
designers to address both issues.
The first question is primarily concerned with low-level system
behavior. Consider the CABG smart alarm example from Sec-
tion 2.1. If the RR monitor updates the system with new values
at a much lower rate than the HR, SpO2 and BP monitors, then
the system must apply some form of event correlation in the pre-
processing stage. For example, one correlator may wait to for-
ward the other signals until the RR value updates. A different cor-
relator could forward events as fast as the fastest vitals monitor
and simply reuse most recent values for vitals which update more
slowly. In essence, a given GSA configuration, along with formal-
ized properties of the individual components, forms a system model
which directly supports component-based model driven develop-
ment (MDD). The component-based MDD approach to software
system design has been successfully applied to the development of
reliable distributed avionics systems [11] and could provide similar
benefits for distributed medical systems.
The toolset required to answer the second question will be differ-
ent from those used to answer the first. The effectiveness of the in-
ference model (i.e. the decision tree, rule table, bayesian network,
etc) in patient care will likely have to be determined by ‘in-silico’
trials against a virtual (simulated or pre-recorded) patient popula-
tion. Hand curated models such as the rule table or an expert system
should be analyzed for both completeness (all possible inputs have
an output) and consistency (a input does not have more than one
output). The GSA explicitly divorces the inference model from the
underlying implementation in order to make it easier for designers
and domain experts to validate the inference model with tools and
approaches appropriate for the specific type of inference model in
question.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we have presented common challenging scenarios
medical professionals face in the hospital room, scenarios in which
we believe that the introduction of computer science techniques in-
cluding system integration, machine learning, and sensor fusion
could lead to major improvements in patient care. We have ex-
plained our position on what we perceive to be an effective way
of surmounting many of the uncertainties inherent in solving chal-
lenging medical problems.
By constructing a flexible, generic software framework which
allows synthesis of patient information and application of machine
learning techniques, uncertainties about the best solutions to spe-
cific application challenges can be addressed through experimenta-
tion.
Additionally, considering the formal verification process neces-
sary when building safety critical systems, we regard the generic ar-
chitecture approach to be advantageous, as once the infrastructure
has been certified and approved, it easily be reused for different
applications. If an application requires the creation of new, pre-
viously uncertified processing tasks, only those new tasks should
have to be certified, potentially reducing the time to market for a
new smart alarm.
We have implemented a prototype of the GSA on the Medical
Device Coordination Framework (MDCF) middleware [17]. This
prototype includes a palette virtual medical device components,
adapter components for some real medical devices, pre-processing
components, and an inference component capable of loading arbi-
trary rule tables. We intend to develop more inference components
capable of loading different types of statistical or decision mod-
els (e.g. Bayesian Belief Networks) as well as formalize the be-
havior of each component’s implementation. We will also produce
detailed GSA instantiations addressing the specific applications de-
scribed in Section 2, and begin testing the usefulness of the systems
in improving critical care, with the hope that ideal configurations
will emerge from the repeated testing and refinement process and
via collaboration with the greater research community.
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